INTRODUCTION
In a not so distant past, Japan was regarded as a cartel haven. 1 The weak enforcement of the Antimonopoly Law (AML) was perceived as one of the problems. one of them being a leniency program. 3 In doing so, Japan has followed the examples of the United States and the European Union in the hybridization of the public enforcement of competition law. This hybridization is being materialized through private actors that enter the process of public enforcement, allowing the public enforcement authorities to rely on these private actors to provide them with information regarding illegal cartel activities. In return, these private actors are awarded with immunity from, or a reduction of the administrative fine (usually referred to as a "surcharge").
This hybrid form of enforcement has proved to be effective in the pursuit of illegal cartels. The leniency program not only revealed the existence of illegal cartel activities, it also allowed the enforcement authorities to better prepare for their investigations. combined with increased penalties, has changed the mindset of Japan's business community." 8 Goto is not alone in his assessment of the Japanese leniency program. Akinori Uesugi certainly agreed. In his assessment of the leniency program after one year of its operation, his conclusion that the leniency program functions effectively is reflected in three observations. 9 First, a relatively high number of leniency applications was noticed during the first half year following its introduction. Second, the cartel cases following the leniency applications were disposed of in a record-quick timeframe. Third, the leniency program offers the possibility of obtaining leniency even after the JFTC has started its investigation. The last is, according to Uesugi, a necessity to lessen the consequences of a leniency application on the reputation of a company.
In an earlier empirical study, I have supported these statements with numbers relating to leniency applications and decisions following these applications. 10 The data revealed that there were indeed many applicants, resulting in a fair number of decisions. Recent data of the JFTC reveals that this trend of many applications has continued. However, the high number of applications has not led to an equally high number of decisions. In fact, the number of decisions is declining by the year. Further, in the decisions that are taken, it may be presumed that, just like in the early years of the leniency program's operation, many of the applicants are situated in the post-investigation stage. 11 This paper seeks to rationalize the small number of decisions as compared to the high number of applications, and to give an overview of possible explanations as to why post-investigation leniency is more frequently used than pre-investigation leniency.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II gives a schematic overview of the for the tendency for an overuse of the post-investigation leniency, and thus why there may be no real race to Kasumigaseki, the place where the JFTC holds its office. Before concluding the analysis on the Japanese leniency program in Section VII, Section VI rationalizes the small number of decisions compared to the total number of leniency applications.
II. THE FEATURES OF THE AMENDED LENIENCY PROGRAM

A. Pre-and Post-Investigation Leniency Applications
The Japanese leniency program is inscribed in the AML in Article 7-2 from paragraphs 10 to 18. Article 7-2 of the AML mainly prescribes the surcharges, a kind of administrative fine that allows the JFTC to take away the financial profits gained by an illegal competition law activity. By incorporating the leniency program into this article, the scope of application of the program automatically reduces. The leniency program will not be extendable to the other sanctions provided for in the AML, whether they are criminal penalties or private damages actions. 
B. Conditions Attached to a Leniency Application
In order to enjoy immunity from or a reduction of the surcharge, the applicant has to fulfill certain conditions. It is not sufficient that an applicant wins the race to
Kasumigaseki. Immunity will only be granted in the pre-investigation stage to the applicant who first submits the reports. 29 While the 2005 leniency program used to require each entrepreneur to submit a report independently of other entrepreneurs, since 29 The process of submitting reports to the JFTC is described in detail in the Rules on Reporting 30 The submission of this report needs to be kept secret from any third party.
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Once reported, the applicant has to terminate the illegal conduct 32 and provide additional assistance in the form of information upon the request of the JFTC. 33 The information provided must not turn out to be false. 34 Further, the applicant may not have coerced other entrepreneurs to participate in the leniency program or prevented an entrepreneur from ceasing such conduct. 35 Similar conditions apply to the applicants who are only entitled to a reduction of the surcharge.
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In the pre-investigation stage, it is important to determine the order of the applicants because the rewards differ. The procedure in this regard is quite rigid. 37 The submission of the first report only secures the position of the applicant provisionally. 38 Failing to submit the second report and the required evidentiary materials within the time period stipulated by the JFTC (usually two weeks) automatically revokes the applicant's previously secured position. 39 An applicant who successfully submits the reports and evidence will be promptly informed about the receipts of such documents. 40 "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of a public work for a tunnel ventilation ordered by the former Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation"; (b) year 2007: (i) dokuritsu gyouseihoujin mizu shigen kikou ga hacchuu suru tokutei damuyou suimon setsubi kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of flood gate facilities for a specific dam ordered by the Japan Water Agency"; (ii) kokudou koutsuushou kakuchihou seibikyoku ga hacchuu suru tokutei kasenyou suimon setsubi kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of flood gate facilities for specific rivers ordered by the local branches of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (iii) kokudou koutsuushou kakuchihou seibikyoku ga hacchuu suru tokutei damuyou suimon setsubi kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of flood gate facilities for specific dams ordered by the the local branches of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (iv) nagoya shiei chikatestu ni kakaru doboku kouji no nyuusatsu dangou jiken ni kakaru kokuhatsu kankei, trans. "Indictment related to a bid-rigging case of public works for Nagoya City's subway"; (v) kinki chihou ni okeru tennen gasueko suteeshion kensetsu kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of construction works for natural gas stations in the Kinki region"; (vi) gasuyou poriechiren kudazugite no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of polyethylene pipe joints for gas"; (vii) gasuyou poriechiren kuda no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of polyethylene pipes for gas"; (viii) oosaka ateji kabushiki gaisha ga hacchuu suru chuuatsu gasu doukan kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of medium pressure gas conduits ordered by Osaka Gas Co., Ltd" and (ix) toukyou ateji kabushiki geisha ga hacchuu suru kouatsu gasu doukan kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of high pressure gas conduits ordered by Tokyo Gas Co., Ltd" and (c) year 2008: (i) marinhoosu no seizou hanbai gyoushara ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of marine hoses"; (ii) gasuyou furekishiburu kudazugite no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of flexible pipe joint for gas"; (iii) gasuyou furekishiburu kudazugite no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of flexible pipe joints for gas"; (iv) stage, i.e. application not preceded by an application for immunity, occurred only in three of the publicized cases. 46 The extensive use of the pre-investigation immunity and the extremely low rate of solely post-investigation reductions showed that any cultural hesitance towards the use of the leniency program barely existed and allayed the fear that leniency programs would not take root in a Japanese business environment.
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The fact that the solely post-investigation cases are quite limited does not mean that leniency within the post-investigation stage has not been used in Japan. Several entrepreneurs have been receiving reduction of the surcharge after an investigation had started. In many of these cases, the investigation started after the JFTC received an application for immunity. In about 12 of the publicized cases, the immunity application in the pre-investigation stage has been followed by an application for reduction in the post-investigation stage. 48 This kind of post-investigation application, i.e. the ones following an immunity application, involved 21 entrepreneurs.
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poripuropirensei shurinkufuirumu no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of polypropylene shrink films"; (v) oosakashi hacchuu no byouinra muke tokutei ekusu senshouchi no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of specific X-ray equipment for hospitals ordered by Osaka City"; (vi) oosakashi hacchuu suru no kenkoujora muke tokutei ekusu senshouchi no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of specific X-ray equipment for health centers ordered by Osaka City"; (vii) zaidanhoujin kekkaku yoboukai hacchuu no tokutei kenshinsha no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of specific car for medical examinations order by the Japan Anti-Tuberculoses Association"; (viii) yokohamashira hacchuu no tokutei ekusu ekusu senshouchi no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of specific X-ray equipment for health centers ordered by Osaka City"; (ix) kouyaita no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of steel sheet piles" and (x) koukangui no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of steel pipe piles". 46 Ibid. The cases concerned are, for (a) year 2007: (i) naisou koujiyou keisan karushiumu ita no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to manufacture and sales firms of calcium silicate board for interior constructions" and (ii) nourinsuisanshou kakunouseikyoku ga hacchuu suru tokutei suimon setsubi kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of the construction of specific flood gate facilities ordered by agricultural agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan" and (b) year 2008: (i) yokohamashi hacchuu no tokutei ekususen shouchi no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru kanchoukin noufu meirei kankei, trans. "Order for the payment of surcharges to the bid participants of specific X-ray equipment ordered by the city of Yokohama". 47 See Akinori Uesugi, "A Leniency Program à la Japonnaise -How it is going to be Enforced Five post-investigation applications were seemingly not triggered by an immunity application. 50 This low number may suggest that firms are willing to come forward with information, and are not waiting for the JFTC's investigations to reveal information. However, the information disclosure does not seem to be the result of anxiety among the cartel participants. If there would be more anxiety, one would expect a high number of 50% pre-investigation reductions. 51 With only four entrepreneurs being granted 50% reductions, it is hard to draw another conclusion than that there does not seem to be a race to Kasumigaseki. 
IV. THE JAPANESE LENIENCY PROGRAM AFTER
B. A Breakdown of the Data on Leniency Applications
By the end of 2009, the JFTC had taken another 16 decisions. 54 Only four decisions involving immunity were publicized. 55 Ten decisions only mentioned two 30%
54 See JFTC, supra note 44. The cases for year 2009: (i) enka biniiruka oyobi doukeishu no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of vinyl chloride pipes and joints"; (ii) kokusai koukuu kamotsu riyou unsou jigyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against international air freight forwarders"; (iii) kakyou kouhappou poriechiren shiito no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against manufacturers and distributors of cross-linked high foaming polyethylene sheets"; (iv) kokudou koutsushou ga tohoku chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Tohoku Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (v) kokudou koutsushou ga kantou chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Kanto Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (vi) kokudou koutsushou ga hokuriku chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Hokuriku Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (vii) kokudou koutsushou ga chuubu chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Chubu Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (viii) kokudou koutsushou ga kinki chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Kinki Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (ix) kokudou koutsushou ga chuugoku chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Chugoku Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (x) kokudou koutsushou ga shikoku chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Shikoku Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (xi) kokudou koutsushou ga kyuushuu chihou seibikyoku ni oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Kyushu Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (xii) kokudou koutsushou ga hokkaidou kaihatsu kyoku oite hacchuu suru sharyou kanri jimu nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for vehicle management jobs of the Hokkaido Regional Development Bureau ordered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism"; (xiii) okayama shi shozai no shiritsu chuugakkou no shuugaku ryokou wo toriatsukau ryoukougaisha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the travel agency managing the school trips of the public junior high school of the city of Okayama"; (xiv) tenuri torihiki ni yori hanbai sareru GL koupan no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of GL steelplates that are sold by store sales business"; (xv) himo tsuki torihiki ni yori keiryou tenjou shita jizai seizou gyousha muke ni hanbai sareru GI koupan no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against manufacturers and sellers of GI steel plates that are sold under conditions directly to manufacturers of light weight ceiling and cellar materials" and (xvi) himo tsuki torihiki ni yori kenzai seihin seizou gyousha muke ni hanbai sareru tokutei karaa koupan no seizou hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of special color steelplates that are sold under conditions directly to manufacturers of building materials". 55 Supra note 54 (the cases concerned are numbers (i), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi)).
reductions, with any reference to immunity. 56 Since only three entrepreneurs could apply for leniency and all of the decisions mentioning only a 30% reduction already involved two entrepreneurs, the conclusion can be drawn that these reductions must be situated in the post-investigation stage. Three of the decisions mentioning immunity also involved a 30% reduction in the post-investigation stage. There is one decision that only mentioned one entrepreneur receiving 30% reduction. 57 As the extensive use of post-investigation can be seen, it could be presumed that this is also a post-investigation decision. However, it is unclear whether there is a non-publicized pre-investigation decision. In one decision, the JFTC found that the entrepreneurs were not involved in behavior requiring the imposition of a surcharge.
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Out of the 15 decisions in 2010, 59 only two decisions have a publicized immunity 56 Ibid. (the cases concerned are numbers (iii) to (xii)). 57 Ibid.
(the case concerned is number (ii)). 58 Ibid. (the case concerned is number (xiii)). 59 See JFTC, supra note 44. The cases for year 2010: (i) toukyou denryoku kabushiki kaisha oyobi dengen kaihatsu kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase mata wa kyousou nyuustsu no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Tokyo Electric Company and Electric Power Companies"; (ii) tohoku denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection for power cables ordered by Tohoku Electric Company"; (iii) chuubu denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase mata wa kyousou nyuustsu no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Chubu Electric Company"; (iv) hokuriku denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Hokuriku Electric Company"; (v) chuugoku denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase mata wa kyousou nyuustsu no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Chugoku Electric Company"; (vi) kyuushuu denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Kyushu Electric Company"; (vii) okinawa denryoku kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru denryoukuyou densen no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in quotation collection or competitive bidding for power cables ordered by Okinawa Electric Company"; (viii) boueishou koukuu jietai ga hacchuu suru keikirui no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturer of office furniture ordered by the Air Self-Defense Force of the Ministry of Defense"; (ix) kawazakishi ga hacchuu suru gesuikankyo kouji nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against participants in bidding for sewer pipe constructions ordered by the city of Kawazaki"; (x) aomorishi ga hacchuu suru doboku isshiki kouji no nyuusatsu sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in the bidding for engineering works ordered by the city of Aomori"; (xi) higashi nihon denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha tou no jigyousha ga hacchuu suru hikari faiba keeburu seihin no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers of optical fiber cable products ordered by the entrepreneurs of Nippon Telegraph and Telegraph East Corporation"; (xii) higashi nihon denshin denwa kabushiki kaisha tou no jigyousha ga hacchuu suru FAS konekuta no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers of FAS connectors ordered by the entrepreneurs of Nippon Telegraph and Telegraph East Corporation"; (xiii) zenkoku jouhou tsuushin shizai kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru netsushuushuku suriifu no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers of heat application. 60 All the other decisions, 13 in total, only referred to a 30% reduction. Six out of the 13 decisions mentioned only one applicant for a 30% reduction. 61 Only two decisions mentioned two applicants for 30% reduction. 62 The other five decisions involved three applicants for 30% reduction. 63 To date, only one decision has an applicant for 50% reduction.
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Unlike in the previous two years, immunity applications have led to several of the decisions taken in 2011 and 2012. In eight of the nine publicized decisions for this period, 65 immunity was granted to a leniency applicant. 66 That means only one decision did not mention immunity. Again, it is difficult to estimate whether this decision was based only on post-investigation applications or whether there was a non-publicized immunity applicant. What is for sure is that the 50% reduction was only used once in 2011, but relatively often in 2012. Almost each decision in 2012, i.e. three out of five, 67 was taken after a successful pre-investigation application for immunity shrink splice protection sleeves ordered by Zenkoku Jouhou Tsuushin Shizai Corporation"; (xiv) kabushiki kaisha enu ti ti dokomo ga hacchuu suru hikari faiba keeburu seihin no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers of optical fiber cable products ordered by NTT Docomo" and (xv) kensetsu -denpan muke densen no seizou gyousha oyobi hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of electric wires for construction and electric wire resale". 60 Supra note 59 (the cases concerned are numbers (viii) and (xv)). 61 Ibid. (the cases concerned are numbers (ix) to (xiv)). 62 Ibid. (the cases concerned are numbers (ii) and (iv)). 63 Ibid. (the cases concerned are numbers (i), (iii), (v), (vi), and (vii)). 64 Ibid. (the case concerned is number (xv)). 65 See JFTC, supra note 44. The cases for year 2011: (i) easepareeto gasu no seizou gyousha oyobi hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of air separation gases"; (ii) LP gasu youki no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufactures of LPG pressure adjusters"; (iii) VVF keeburu no seizou gyousha oyabi hanbai gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers and sellers of VVF cables" and (iv) LP gasu kyoukyuki no seizou gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the manufacturers of LPG instruments". The cases for year 2012: (i) toyota jidousha kabushiki kaisha tou ga hacchuu suru jidoushayou waiyaa haanesu oyobi doukanren seihin no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in a quotation collection for automotive wire harnesses and related products ordered by Toyota Motor Company"; (ii) daihatsu kougyou kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru jidoushayou waiyaa haanesu no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in a quotation collection for automotive wire harnesses ordered by Daihatsu Motor Company"; (iii) honda giken kougyou kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru jidoushayou waiyaa haanesu oyobi doukanren seihin no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in a quotation collection for automotive wire harnesses and related products ordered by Honda Motor Company"; (iv) nissan jidousha kabushiki kaisha tou ga hacchuu suru jidoushayou waiyaa haanesu oyobi doukanren seihin no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in a quotation collection for automotive wire harnesses and related products ordered by Nissan Motor Company" and (v) fujistu kougyou kabushiki kaisha ga hacchuu suru jidoushayou waiyaa haanesu oyobi doukanren seihin no mitsumori awase no sanka gyousha ni tai suru ken, trans. "Case against the participants in a quotation collection for automotive wire harnesses and related products ordered by Fujitsu Motor Company". From 2011, and especially in 2012, the trend reversed again. Immunity was widely published. Moreover, 50% reductions were also often granted. In these cases, it is not sure whether there was even a post-investigation at all. Ultimately, the fact that a 50% reduction had been used may indicate that something else other than a sudden friction, for example, is at play in the break-up of the cartel.
V. DELAYED APPLICATION FOR LENIENCY A. No Race to Kasumigaseki
Cartel participants do not seem to be in a hurry to reveal their cartel participation to the JFTC. If this were not the case, the number of pre-investigation reduction of 50% would be much higher. Currently, it has only been used in a total of nine decisions. . The argument could be made that it is just because of the secretive nature of the leniency application that there are few applicants taking the second position in the pre-investigation stage. Keeping the immunity application secret, allows the enforcement agency to prepare for the dawn raid and surprise the other cartel participants. However, the point made in this section is that, if a leniency program offers incentives to report, the reporting should occur irrespective of the fact that one knows that the other cartel participant has already reported.
conditional leniency  Cultural issues -making it socially unacceptable to self-report 70 Many of the problems identified by lawyers as possible reasons for inhibiting self-reporting are not present in the Japanese context. Indeed, leniency can be obtained after investigation has started. 71 Potential applicants for leniency can inform themselves with the JFTC on whether leniency is still applicable. 72 The leniency program in Japan is transparent and clear, not requiring an amnesty plus system to be in place. 73 The JFTC has flowcharts detailing the obligations of all parties in each stage of the leniency procedure. 74 Leniency is automatic for the first applicant, as long as he complies with a set of clear and simple obligations. The order of the application is determined by the time the JFTC receives a fax from the applicant on a fax machine installed for this purpose. This initial submission of information does not have to be more than a document revealing the existence of a cartel and the names of the entrepreneurs involved, thus acting as a kind of indicator. 75 The applicants do not have to establish all the elements of an offence; they only have to provide the information they have at hand.
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Excluding cultural issues from the path to a successful leniency program is extremely difficult. The business community has indicated that such cultural issues will prevent the leniency program from operating effectively, which has been earlier rebutted by the fact that the entrepreneurs would apply for leniency in the pre-investigation stage.
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A Japanese lawyer has further indicated that some of the other issues mentioned above may be problematic. 78 in the Japanese leniency program, the analysis has also to turn to the presence of a pre-requisite for a successful leniency program, i.e. a rigorous enforcement system. Linked to this issue is the question whether a leniency application in one jurisdiction may lead to an investigation in another jurisdiction. Lawyers have indicated that this may inhibit self-reporting. This will be even truer if the other jurisdiction has a stricter competition law and policy than the jurisdiction where leniency is concerned.
B. The Fear for Criminal Prosecution and Leniency Applications
The scope of the Japanese leniency program is limited to the administrative surcharge.
The leniency program does not apply to the criminal sanctions provided for in the AML.
This means that the JFTC still has the power to file a criminal accusation with the public prosecutor. The JFTC has the exclusive power to do so. 79 Hence, it is somehow within the discretion of the JFTC to take steps in a case for which it has granted immunity from or reduction of the surcharge. As long as no steps are taken by the JFTC, the public prosecutor cannot act. The problem really starts, though, from the moment a criminal accusation has been made. Not the JFTC, but the public prosecutor decides at this stage who among the cartel participants should be prosecuted. 80 Aware that this discretion belonging to both the JFTC and the public prosecutors may prevent cooperation under the Japanese leniency program, the Ministry of Justice has declared that the public prosecutors need to respect the decisions of the JFTC. 81 The decision to be made by the JFTC is to exclude an entrepreneur, granted immunity, from a criminal accusation. Hence, at this level, the discretion still stands. The use of this discretion will be exercised more likely in the case of the second and third applicants.
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In any case, the JFTC will assess whom to exclude from a criminal accusation, in close cooperation with the Public Prosecutor's Office.
The first case in which the JFTC has filed a criminal accusation after an entrepreneur was granted immunity involved the bid-rigging for a project to extend subway Line 6 from Nonami to Tokushige. Five major companies agreed to prearrange the bid winner and also the bidding price. In doing so, they violated several articles of the AML on which criminal sanctions are also imposed. 83 When the JFTC decided to proceed with the criminal accusation, they expressly stated that the first applicant under the leniency program, Hazama, would not face the criminal accusation. 84 Several other cases developed along the same line, confirming the practice that the applicant for leniency is shielded for a criminal accusation.
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Even though the practices of the JFTC and the public prosecutor are in line with the guidelines, it should be pointed out that lawyers often inform their clients of a possible risk of prosecution if they apply for leniency. 86 These lawyers fulfill their duty to inform the clients about the risks related to revealing participation in illegal activities so that they cannot be held responsible for any breach of informational duty.
Entrepreneurs estimating the risk they are taking by revealing their participation in a cartel will most likely not be scared off by the lawyers' advice. In general, criminal prosecution has been barely used. This may be an indicator that this kind of cases are being perceived as a graver infringement of the AML than other price fixing cartels, which seem to be the majority of cartels exposed by a leniency application. 
C. The Fear for Private Damages Actions and Leniency Applications
The leniency program in Japan does not extend to private damages actions. Nonetheless, Article 25 of the AML provides private parties with the avenue to file for damages in court when they sustain harm from a competition law infringement. Further, it is accepted practice that the general tort provision of the Japanese Civil Code, Article 709, can also be the basis of a private competition law action. The major difference between these two ways of obtaining damages is that Article 25 of the AML provides a jump start for the private enforcer as the JFTC has already handed down a formal decision on the competition law infringement, while under Article 709 of the Civil Code, the private parties launching the complaint have to prove the competition law infringement themselves. 87 Even though the legislation and the courts allow for private damages actions, these have been underused for a long time. 88 In fact, Japan has been criticized by the United States for its lack of private actions. 89 From the adoption of the AML in 1947 until the beginning of the 1970s, there were only five private damages actions reported. 90 The slight increase in private damages actions during the 1970s could not consolidate itself.
It was only since the 1990s that a surge in private damages actions was noticeable. A study conducted by Simon Vande Walle details the characteristics of this surge in private damages actions. 91 According to this scholar, the increase in filings has been caused by residents' law suits and suits for injunctive relief. 92 The real private damages actions, i.e. the ones not related to residents' suits and injunctive relief, only increased after 2002. 93 In another study, Vande Walle points out that the increase of private damages actions may contribute to deterrence. 94 The deterrent effect is not due to an increased detectability of cartels; instead, it is the monetary increase of the sanctions that is contributing to the deterrent effect. 95 Most of the private damages actions followed an investigation of the JFTC. Vande Walle further indicates that most of these private damages actions related to bid-rigging infringements.
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Putting together these observations by Vande Walle, one could intuitively draw the conclusion that leniency is not a desired strategy for entrepreneurs engaged in bid-rigging. The chance of having to pay damages is relatively higher in the case of bid-rigging than other forms of price fixing. Whether entrepreneurs in Japan want to avoid these private damages actions is an empirical question not yet answered. However, it is a fact that since the implementation of the leniency program in Japan, the total number of decisions on bid-rigging has dropped. 97 The number of bid-rigging cases revealed through leniency was still high in the early years of the leniency program.
However, this number now equates with the number of other price fixing cartels.
D. The Fear for Foreign Follow-Up Actions
Even though Japan has made considerable efforts in stepping up its enforcement of competition law, the enforcement and sanctioning are still not equivalent to those in the European Union and the United States. The European Union can count on fierce public enforcement of competition law, which allows for the imposition of substantial fines.
The United States relies much more on private enforcement, in which the affected parties can rely on treble damages. Japan, on the contrary, is limited by the law in the calculation of fines, and private enforcement has not become a substantial part in the enforcement.
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Japan?" (2012) 2:4 Asian Journal of Law and Economics at 6-8. 95 Ibid. at 22-25. 96 Supra note 90 at 20 (the explanation is presented in Graph 3). 97 See Appendix Table V : Types of Cartels. Note that the affected party in a bid-rigging case has an advantage over the affected parties in other price fixing cartels. The affected parties are not dispersed, hence no coordination problems occur. The directly affected parties are most likely to be with a small number. The financial stake in the price fixing cartel will be fairly high. Therefore, the affected party has an incentive to start a private damages action. It should also be pointed out that legislation has been adopted to reduce bid-rigging in Japan. 98 The number of bid-rigging cases in fiscal year 2011 is relatively high compared to the price fixing cases. However, no detailed information has yet been given regarding the involvement of leniency in either of this kind of cartel cases. Japan Fair Trade Commission, "Enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act in FY2011 (Summary)" (6 June 2012), online: <http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/120606EnforcementofAMAinFY2011_Summary.pdf>. 99 Supra note 90 at 27-28 indicating that private enforcement has not been developed in Japan yet, unlike in the United States); see also supra note 94 at 11 detailing the reasons why Japan is not able to reach an Being confronted with rigorous enforcement regimes abroad, lawyers will be careful in advising their clients to proceed with a leniency application for an international cartel in the least harmful competition law regime. 100 A rational approach would be to first secure lenient treatment in the overseas jurisdictions; 101 except for the cartel involving motor parts, 102 which seems to be triggered by the JFTC's investigation into related sectors investigations, data seems to confirm this proposition. Almost all of the cartel participants applying for leniency were involved in a cartel domestic in nature. Recently there seems to be a reversed trend, whereby the Japanese companies are seeking for leniency after having been investigated in other jurisdictions.
E. Less Saliency and Overconfidence Bias Builds Trust Among Cartel Participants
If the limited scope of the leniency program cannot be an explanation for the absence of a race to confess to the participation in an illegal cartel and there are no other specific problems with the conceptualization of the leniency program in Japan, attention has to be paid to what the ICN determines as the pre-requisites for a successful leniency program. A high risk of detection, making it a vigorous enforcement program, has to be combined with strong sanctions in order for cartel participants to defect the cartel.
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It has been extensively documented that the enforcement of competition law in Japan used to be very weak. 105 The weaknesses were entangled in many aspects. The JFTC optimal sanction. See Schaede at supra note 1 at 117-118 where the author makes a comparison between the average profits earned from bid-rigging and the surcharged levied to indicate that the levied surcharge is often below profits gained. 100 Supra note 70 at 4 indicating that the possibility of an action elsewhere will diminish the chances of getting positive advice for applying for leniency. The big question, then, is to what extent the business community is aware of this evolution. The budget increase, translated into more human resources for the investigation division, is published on a yearly basis. 114 If the business community does not receive news on the effective enforcement of the AML, this may not achieve the desired deterrent effect. The less noticeable cartel enforcement is, the higher the likelihood will be that the business community underestimates the probability to be detected.
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106 Supra note 87 at 32. 107 Ibid. at 31-32. 108 Ibid. at 38-39. 109 Ibid. at 51 indicating that since the 1970s, the JFTC has made an effort to overhaul the system of legal cartels and supra note 1 at 79, 81-92. 110 Supra note 10 at 120-121 and see also, Schaede, supra note 1 at 115-118. 111 See Schaede, supra note 1 at 115-118. Public enforcement is well published on the website of the JFTC. Each decision taken is published in Japanese, and almost all are translated into English.
116 Some of the major cases reach the newspapers, but only the most egregious ones, which often also involve corruption, 117 are spread out over several editions of the newspaper. 118 Most of these eye-catching cases are again related to bid-rigging, a domain in which the leniency program is less effective. Data on private enforcement is even less visible to the general public. In order to create a database of all private damages actions in Japan, Vande
Walle had to look at a variety of sources in his attempt to gather all private damages actions that Japan has known since the implementation of the AML. 119 Business executives may therefore have underestimated the chance of being caught.
The lack of attention paid to cartel behaviour in the general newspapers may be compensated by compliance session. However, the impossibility to back up statements regarding infringements of competition law with hard numbers of entrepreneurs being caught will feed into the underestimation of the probability to be detected. The enforcement general enforcement statistics published at the end of each fiscal year on the JFTC website, 120 reveal a downward trend in relation to the number of decisions taken on illegal competition law behavior.
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Considering that people have a general tendency to "overestimate the probability of goods things happening to them, and underestimate the probability of bad things happening to them," 122 the already underestimated probability of detection will be fortified. This so-called overconfidence may contribute to the building of trust among the cartel participants. It is this trust among the cartel participants that prevents a cartel from internally busting up. In the absence of undermined trust among the cartel participants, the enforcement authorities have to wait either for conflicts to happen among the cartel participants, changes in the management of the cartel participants 123 or a controlled defection.
F. Controlled Defection
Wouter Wils has pointed out that the installation of a leniency program may have negative consequences. 124 Lenient treatment reduces the costs of collusion. The combined sum of all the administrative surcharges imposed on the cartel participants will be lower if some of the cartel participants have applied for leniency, leaving much more profit to be distributed among the cartel participants. This requires, of course, that the cartel participants can anticipate that the enforcement authority will investigate their cartel. 125 It is unlikely that a concerted application will occur in the pre-investigation stage in Japan. Even if the entrepreneurs were taking advantage of the possibility to informally inquire with the JFTC on the availability of leniency, a concerted application would logically trigger a sudden revelation of information through the leniency program. The expected result would be the granting of not only immunity, but also 50% and 30%
pre-investigation reductions. However, the 50% reductions are scarce.
It will be much easier to concert the application for leniency in the post-investigation
stage. There will be knowledge of an investigation by the JFTC. However, it is hard to categorize this as a negative effect of the leniency program. It is rather, a rational choice for entrepreneurs to apply for leniency once they have knowledge of an investigation by the JFTC. This is also advantageous for the JFTC because they will receive more information from these entrepreneurs.
G. Difficulties in Judging the Lack of a Race
In 2009 and 2010, the data on the leniency program revealed a huge decrease in the number of firms that were granted immunity. During these years, the data on the leniency applications might have created the impression that immunity has barely been used. This may fortify the conclusion that there is no race to come forward with information. Such a conclusion cannot be drawn.
The publication of a leniency application is not an obligation. Hence, not all leniency applicants will decide to reveal their participation in the leniency program. A real incentive for publicizing the application does not exist, except for cases of bid-rigging.
In these cases, an application for publication can reduce the period during which one cannot participate in a public bidding process by half. 126 Hence, the exact motives of cartelists to publish their leniency application, barring those involved in bid-rigging cases, is unknown.
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Getting an exact picture of why many entrepreneurs have decided not to publish their application is impossible. The absence of a race to report is one characteristic of the Japanese leniency program.
Another feature is the high number of applications. Indeed, nearly 500 applications were submitted during the six years of the leniency program's operation. This high number may be explained by the fact that, once a cartel participant, for whatsoever reason, decides to apply for leniency, the application process is straightforward, especially in relation to the information that has to be submitted to the JFTC.
Immunity from or reduction of the surcharge does not come free. The AML requires the applicant to submit true reports and materials in relation to the illegal activity. Nothing in the AML mentions that this information needs to enable a dawn raid, to detect an infringement or to provide information with significant added value. However, the AML seems to require more than a good cartel story. The Rules on Reporting and Submission of Materials Regarding Immunity from or Reduction of Surcharges (Leniency Rules) detail the information that has to be submitted. 130 The Leniency Rules establish that in the pre-investigation stage, two reports have to be submitted. 131 The first report to be submitted is a summary of the illegal cartel activity, including the name of the applicant, the market concerned, a description of the infringement and the time of implementation.
The description of the infringement does not only require specifying the type of infringement but also the names of the cartel participants, the geographical reach of the cartel, and the influence the cartel has on pricing. Other types of infringements may need some infringement-specific information, such as the contract-awarding agency in case of bid-rigging.
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The second report, for which the JFTC stipulates a deadline after submitting the first report, is more extensive. 133 Besides repeating the content in the first report, information about the individual involved in the illegal cartel activity has to be provided.
This information extends beyond the particulars of the applicant to the particulars of the entrepreneurs participating in the cartel. Ultimately, the second report expects the applicant to state the materials it has in relation to the illegal cartel activity. 134 In other words, these materials should offer proof of the statements made in relation to the existence of the cartel and the involvement of the alleged cartelists. The materials can be memorandums of meetings, correspondence with other entrepreneurs or written reports in relation to the cartel activity. 135 It is sufficient that these materials contain adequate information to start investigations; these materials need not to prove an infringement.
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It can thus be said that, once the choice is made to reveal the cartel to the JFTC, relatively limited information needs to be submitted in order to be a successful leniency applicant. This certainly incentivizes defectors to apply for leniency, as not much ambiguity exists regarding the possibility of obtaining leniency. 137 Daniel Sokol, in doing research on the US enforcement system, has pointed out that generous leniency programs will trigger strategic behavior. It may be that many of the leniency applications to the JFTC are "questionable 'gray' behavior rather than clear-cut antitrust violations." Entrepreneurs would engage in this kind of strategic leniency behavior to punish rivals in the market. D. Daniel Sokol, "Cartels, are included in the statistics. However, not all these publicized applications lead to a decision. At first sight, this may seem odd in light of the increased budget which translates into more human resources for the investigation department.
B. Many applications but few decisions despite an increased budget
An estimation of the number of cartels that exist in a country is impossible. The secrecy in which cartels veil themselves does not even allow making a wild guess on what is happening in the business community. In that sense, it is also difficult to make an estimation on whether the leniency program is deterring businesses from forming cartels.
The total number of decisions taken by the JFTC may push for such a conclusion.
However, the total number of leniency applications indicates that something is going on, which does not find its reflection in the number of formal decisions. A possible explanation for this trend of few decisions may be the change in the enforcement policy. An enforcement policy is also determined by financial constraints. An enforcement authority operates within financial constraints, and it can only undertake so many investigations as it can handle. Therefore, the available budget will determine how the enforcement policy looks like. Budget wise, the JFTC has seen its budget increase for consecutive years at least since FY2005. 139 This is one year ahead of the date that the but increased again in FY2010. In the following two fiscal years, the budget shrunk again but never declined below that in FY2008. Even though there was a decrease in budget, it did not seem to have affected the expansion of the investigation section. 140 Nevertheless, the gradual increase of personnel in this section should not be interpreted as necessarily beneficial for the leniency program. Within the Investigation Bureau, the leniency program is only dealt with by one particular section, which comprises fewer than ten people. 141 This group has to handle all the leniency applications. An increase in the number of applications will automatically mean that cases have to be prioritized amongst the other caseload of the JFTC. Once the leniency application has been processed, an investigation team has to be available to proceed with the case.
C. "Deferred Prosecution"-Another Way to be Lenient
Leniency programs are adopted to facilitate the finding of information in the highly secretive environment of cartel formation. A high number of applications statistically should intuitively result in a high number of decisions. This correlation is not reflected in the Japanese data. The lack of a correlation between the number of applications and the number of leniency-receiving firms may be a result of the way data is collected. The simplicity of the application procedure means that any kind of application for leniency is reflected in the data that are published by the JFTC. Not all of these applications provide enough information to start a formal investigation. Some applications may be trivial, but are still reflected in the statistics. 143 Other applications may be more relevant, but require an additional request for extra information.
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What is for sure is that the leniency applicant will be under investigation. Besides the information that he has submitted in the reports and the necessary evidence to prove that information, the JFTC will send out requests for information. The applicant has to cooperate with these requests. During this period of time, the applicant has to keep his leniency application confidential, and he also has to withdraw from the cartel. The applicant's sudden withdrawal from the cartel may undermine the trust among other cartel participants. In the worst case for the cartel (but the best case for the JFTC), the co-conspirators may be alarmed by such a withdrawal. Suspicion may grow that he has informed the JFTC about the cartel, eventually triggering off the termination of the cartel.
If the JFTC has enough information regarding the cartel, a dawn raid can be conducted for gathering further information. This dawn raid will most likely not be conducted only at the premises of the entrepreneur applying for leniency, since he has already submitted several documents during the application. In order to supplement that information, investigations will be held at the premises of the other entrepreneurs. 145 This investigation is not limited to the search for documents; it can also involve the interrogation of persons and collection of statements. 146 These investigations will reveal the knowledge of the JFTC regarding the illegal conduct. At this point, not only will the leniency applicant know that the JFTC is aware of the cartel, the other cartel participants whose premises have been raided will also be aware of the investigation.
The investigative act will cause anxiety among the cartel participants, many of whom will only be open to those entrepreneurs who have knowledge to add on to the information that the JFTC already has. Post-investigation leniency applications will surely send a deathblow to the cartel. Not only does the original leniency applicant have to abstain from participating in the cartel, this duty of abstinence also rests on the post-investigation applicants. Even without post-investigation leniency applicants, the cartel participants may start suspecting and questioning one another as to how the JFTC became aware of the cartel. In the end, trust among the cartel participants, the most important element to guarantee the success of a cartel, will be undermined. The cartel is doomed to disappear.
The JFTC does not have to reach a formal decision to achieve a result that is desirable for the market, i.e. the disappearance of the cartel. Cartels can be eliminated without any of the possible negative collateral consequences arising from a formal decision. An example of these collateral consequences is the suspension from participating in future government procurements.
Bringing this idea even further, a formal decision will force the entrepreneurs who have not applied for leniency to bear the consequences of the illegal cartel activity, while the leniency applicants walk free. A competition law regime that does not focus on compensation for the illegal conduct could aim at reaching for the cartel problem that does not harm any of the cartel participants. This solution could be the pursuit of a strategy of merely investigating. The JFTC will concentrate on gathering information on illegal cartel conduct. The knowledge that the JFTC has information may automatically break the cartel and hold the cartel participants only responsible to the extent that the cartel disappears. In the end, the leniency applicant has to terminate his participation in the illegal cartel. Further investigation, with the loss of his place in the order of leniency applications, hangs as a sword of Damocles above the head of the leniency applicant for continued participation in the cartel.
The idea that the JFTC defers decision shows similarities with the practice of deferred prosecution agreements. The main aim of these deferred prosecution agreements is to impose "remediation and compliance conditions on companies that engage in wrongdoing." 148 Compliance with these conditions will free the company from indictment. These conditions can be combined with the imposition of substantial fines. 149 Unlike the deferred prosecution agreements, the conditions for deferral of a decision by the JFTC are not decided on a case-by-case basis. The conditions are statutory, stipulated in the AML. The JFTC also does not have the option to impose a substantial fine. However, the JFTC has the option to take up the case and issue a surcharge order until three years after the termination of the violation.
The cases on which the JFTC has chosen to defer the decision seem to be within their own discretion. No formal guidelines have been developed. Based upon the lately publicized cases, a prudent conclusion could be drawn that the JFTC has chosen to proceed on cases in which there is either a Japan-wide effect or in cases where the same entrepreneurs have been active in various cartels until a final decision is made. 150 The non-availability of data on the applications that do not end up with a final decision implicates that the opposite conclusion cannot be drawn. In other words, it is not for sure that the cases where the JFTC is more lenient are cases of minor importance.
A cartel that has been reported to the JFTC, but on which the decision is being deferred brings several advantages towards the cartel participants. These advantages are not limited only to the leniency applicants, but also extend to all cartel participants. The cartel participants involved in these cartels cannot be considered as recidivists for the calculation of future surcharges. 151 They will also face no exposure to criminal prosecution. Private damages actions will become more difficult as the private parties will share the full burden of proof for establishing the violations. Their participation in public procurement projects is also not impaired. Last but not least, none of the entrepreneurs will be stigmatized as a defector. In a community where durable economic relationships are considered important, this may be the preferred outcome. All cartel participants can easily rehabilitate within the business community.
The JFTC's practice of 'letting escape' several of the AML offenders shows remarkable parallels with the Japanese criminal justice system. 152 Daniel Foote has, in his study in "The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice", indicated that the Japanese police succeeded in clearing on average about 60% of all reported crimes, but only arrested less than 20% of the suspects. 153 This does not mean, however, that all the other suspects are left 'untouched'. Many of the suspects are being questioned carefully and all sorts of information are collected from them. The police seem to go further than only looking for evidence, to the extent that they are seeking to learn more about the character and the personal circumstances of the suspect. Besides, the police will also "admonish him or her not to commit crimes in the future."
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According to Foote, this whole approach is based on the fact that the Japanese authorities focus their criminal justice system on reintegration of the offender into the society. Giving lenient sanctions and portraying benevolence of the state towards the offender facilitate reintegration of such offenders. 155 Extending this to the JFTC and the application of its leniency program, the JFTC engages in a careful investigation of the cartel before aiming at reinstituting the cartel participants into the business community.
The investigations should function as the deterrent factor for discontinuing the current illegal activity and not engaging in this kind of activities in the future. The deferral of a decision is the authority practising benevolence.
To repay the benevolence, the criminal justice system is also paternalistic in the sense that it "depends on great trust in public official [s] ." 156 In order to protect the general interest of the society, the state appropriates a relatively big discretion. This discretion manifests itself in the gathering and use of information on the offender and the offence, but also in deciding how to deal with the case. 157 In cases where a decision was taken and published, a trend is noticeable that an immunity application is not often followed by a second pre-investigation application.
This may indicate a lack of a race to report the illegal cartel activity. Reasons for this inertia of the entrepreneurs include the fear of criminal sanctions, private damages actions or follow-up actions abroad, increased trust built among the cartel partners or concerted defection. Of all these possible reasons, the fear of private damages actions or follow-up actions abroad, together with an increased trust building amongst cartelists, may have been determinant to explain the absence of a real race to Kasumigaseki. Number of Investigators
